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Veil piercing doctrines have been the subject of much scholarly 
attention in recent years.1 They have generated diametrically 
opposing views, with some legal commentators advocating the 
complete abolition of the doctrines and others advocating a 
significant relaxation of the standards for piercing the corporate veil.  
Those who advocate abolition of these doctrines argue that 
limited liability for corporations has significant economic benefits.2 
These scholars argue that aside from reducing the costs of equity 
ownership and facilitating economic growth, limited liability 
facilitates diversification of investment, reduces monitoring costs, 
increases liquidity of shares, and encourages managers to undertake 
beneficial projects that otherwise might be deemed too risky. 
Allowing plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil and the shield of 
limited liability removes these benefits and creates uncertainty for 
 
 1. The scholarly interest in this topic is fueled, in part, by its practical significance. 
Many commentators have asserted that “the problem is one of the most frequently litigated in 
all of corporate law.” Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” 
“Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited 
Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 405, 411 (2006); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A 
Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1065 (2006) (“Veil piercing has been one of the 
most hotly debated concepts in business law.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and 
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 81 (1991) (“The limited liability of corporate 
shareholders is one of the most controversial issues in corporate law.”); Robert B. Thompson, 
The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 
(1997) (“Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 495 
(2001) (“[T]here is a widely shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to 
attracting the enormous amount of investment capital necessary for industrial corporations to 
arise and flourish.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90–98 (1985); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing 
of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 164 
(1992) (“If it is true that the original justification of limited liability was that it encourages 
investment in the small firm, or investment by entrepreneurs of modest means, and if we are 
still interested in encouraging individual entrepreneurship through incorporation, this ought to 
be, perhaps, the most crucial aspect to be considered in veil-piercing doctrine.”).  
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investors and other corporate stakeholders—particularly in light of 
the standards applied by courts that are often less than clear. 
In contrast, those who seek to relax the requirements for 
piercing the corporate veil argue that limited liability improperly 
shifts costs onto innocent creditors.3 As a result, management may 
undertake business activities that are harmful to society because they 
are able to externalize the risk of such projects, resulting in a moral 
hazard problem. These costs, such commentators assert, outweigh 
the benefits of limited liability.  
However, there may be a middle ground between these two 
positions. It may be possible to identify certain areas in which all 
sides agree veil piercing is inappropriate. One such area may exist 
where the corporations at issue operate within an industry that is 
subject to regulations that seek to prevent the sorts of conduct that 
the veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy. In essence, it may 
be appropriate to acknowledge a sort of regulatory preemption in 
such circumstances given that that regulation mitigates the costs 
associated with limited liability. 
Part I of this Article discusses the standards courts apply in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil. The law recognizes 
a strong presumption in favor of preserving limited liability. 
Accordingly, the test for piercing the corporate veil is a stringent 
one. Generally, courts require that the party seeking to overcome 
limited liability demonstrate that there is significant “domination and 
control” over the entity whose veil is to be pierced, that there is an 
element of fraud in the use of the corporate form that warrants 
disregarding it, and that the fraudulent use of the corporate form has 
caused plaintiffs some injury. Courts have developed a number of 
factors to assess whether these conditions have been met, none of 
which is dispositive. Nonetheless, these factors tend to underscore 
the high barrier a party must surmount to pierce the corporate veil. 
Part II discusses some of the criticisms of the veil piercing 
doctrines. Some commentators have argued that veil piercing should 
be eliminated altogether because the standards articulated by courts 
are so vague that they are unworkable and because the benefits of 
limited liability clearly outweigh any associated costs. On the other 
hand, some recent academic literature has proposed expansion of 
 
 3. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880, 1920 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1996). 
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shareholder liability by eroding the standards for breaching the 
corporate form. These proposals are often justified on the ground 
that limited liability improperly allows corporations to shift the costs 
of their risky activities to innocent third parties and that the benefits 
associated with limited liability are not as great as some have argued. 
Part III discusses examples of existing regulatory frameworks that 
govern many of the same activities that determine whether courts 
will pierce the corporate veil. While the principles articulated in this 
Article may be widely applicable, the Article focuses in particular on 
regulations governing the insurance and banking industries. 
Regulatory frameworks, such as those found in these industries, 
ensure that corporations are not subject to the sort of “domination 
and control” necessary to pierce the corporate veil and that the 
corporate form is not misused for some fraudulent purpose. 
Accordingly, the regulatory framework seeks to prevent the very 
conduct that the veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy. 
Regulators in multiple states constantly monitor corporate 
entities operating within the insurance industry, for example, to 
ensure that they remain adequately capitalized and capable of 
meeting their obligations to policyholders. Likewise, federal 
regulators in the banking industry seek to ensure that banks are 
adequately capitalized and that transactions among entities within a 
corporate structure do not undermine their financial security. Such 
regulations construct a series of legal “firewalls” among the 
companies to prevent any inappropriate transfer of assets from one 
entity to another. Such regulatory frameworks also preclude the sort 
of “domination and control” that is necessary to establish alter ego 
liability. Regulators monitor corporations operating within the 
industry to ensure that they observe corporate formalities. 
Accordingly, the rationale behind the veil piercing doctrines simply 
does not apply. 
Finally, Part IV offers a modest proposal for limitation of the veil 
piercing doctrine that commentators on both ends of the academic 
spectrum should embrace. Courts should not apply this doctrine to 
companies that operate within a regulatory framework that 
essentially precludes alter ego relationships.4 In such circumstances, 
the dangers the veil piercing doctrines seek to remedy are already 
 
 4. This article treats the veil piercing and alter ego doctrines as synonymous. See 
Outokumpu Eng’g Enters. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1996) (noting that alter ego theory and veil piercing are “analogous”). 
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mitigated. Moreover, corporations operating within such regulatory 
frameworks have a legitimate expectation that they will not be 
subject to such liability. 
Accordingly, the rationale for maintaining limited liability under 
such circumstances is even stronger. Such regulatory frameworks 
reduce the economic costs of limited liability and preserve the 
benefits. Conversely, veil piercing in such circumstances only results 
in additional, and unnecessary, costs given that entities operating 
within these industries already incur the costs associated with the 
regulatory framework that mitigates the same dangers that veil 
piercing is designed to prevent. In these circumstances, the case for 
veil piercing is substantially weaker.  
I. STANDARDS FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
The presumption of limited shareholder liability is a “bedrock” 
principle of corporate law.5 “[D]istinct corporations, even parent and 
subsidiary corporations, are presumed separate.”6 Indeed, this has 
been the case “since the earliest days of our corporate law.”7 As a 
consequence, “[s]hareholder protection through the corporate form 
is ‘ingrained in our economic and legal systems.’”8 Moreover, the 
limited liability associated with the corporate form has played a 
significant role “‘in the expansion of industry and in the growth of 
trade and commerce.’”9 Courts and legislatures have long recognized 
that “‘furthering of capital formation could best be accomplished by 
 
 5. Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ind. 2004); 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 43 
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006) [hereinafter FLETCHER] (“As a general rule, two separate 
corporations are regarded as distinct legal entities even if the stock of one is owned wholly or 
partly by the other. . . . Thus, generally, absent fraud or bad faith, a parent corporation will not 
be liable for the acts of its subsidiary.”). 
 6. Greater Hammond Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Mutka, 735 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 2000) 
(citing McQuade v. Draw Tite Inc., 659 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. 1995)); see also Hickman v. 
Rawls, 638 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (“The general rule is that a corporate 
entity may not be ignored.”); Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 
468 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (“Delaware courts disregard the corporate entity in only the 
most extraordinary cases.”). 
 7. Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 1994). 
 8. Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability 
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)); see also Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 2, at 89 (“Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law.”).  
 9. Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 8, at 
193). 
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encouraging shareholders to invest through limiting their 
liability.’”10 As a result, “[l]imited liability is the rule not the 
exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast 
enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.”11 
Given the critical importance of limited liability in our economic 
and legal systems, “the burden on a party seeking to ‘pierce the 
corporate veil’ is severe.”12 “‘[C]ourts will pierce the corporate veil 
only in exceptional circumstances.’”13 Accordingly, disregarding the 
corporate form and imposing liability on affiliated corporate entities 
is an “extreme remedy, sparingly used.”14 A party seeking to 
disregard the corporate form must show that it was “‘so ignored, 
controlled or manipulated’” that the subsidiary was “‘merely the 
instrumentality of another and that the misuse of the corporate form 
would constitute a fraud or promote injustice.’”15  
In a breach of contract case, the burden is even higher than the 
normally severe burden imposed upon a plaintiff seeking to pierce 
the corporate veil.16 The burden on plaintiffs “must be more 
 
 10. Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Presser, supra note 2, 
at 155). 
 11. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 
41.10 (“Courts generally apply the alter ego rule with great caution and reluctance. In fact, 
many courts require exceptional circumstances before disregarding the corporate form.”). 
 12. Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ind. 2004) 
(quoting Aronson, 644 N.E.2d at 867); see also Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 918, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“It is the plaintiff’s burden to overcome the 
presumption of the separate existence of the corporate entity.” (citing MacPherson v. 
Eccleston, 190 Cal. App. 2d 24, 27 (1961))). Several courts have held that an alter ego 
relationship must be demonstrated by “clear and convincing” evidence. See, e.g., Kaplan v. First 
Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Because alter ego is akin to and has 
elements of fraud, . . . it . . . must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 13. Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting National 
Precast Crypt Co. v. Dy-Core of Pa., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (W.D. Pa. 1992)). 
 14. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Super. Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (citing Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 677); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 507 
(“Control is the common (if sometimes implicit) feature of all the concepts used to describe 
cases in which veil piercing is appropriate.”). 
 15. Escobedo, 818 N.E.2d at 933 (quoting Aronson, 644 N.E.2d at 867). 
 16. Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 908, 
913 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[P]resumption [of limited liability] is particularly strong in contract 
cases, in which plaintiff has chosen the party with which it has contracted, and may negotiate 
guarantees or other security arrangements.”); Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 375 
(Tex. 1984) (“Courts have generally been less reluctant to disregard the corporate entity in 
tort cases than in breach of contract cases.”); FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.85 (“[C]ourts 
usually apply more stringent standards to piercing the corporate veil in contract cases than they 
do in tort cases.”). 
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stringent in contract cases than in tort cases because in contract cases 
the plaintiff has an opportunity to select the entity with which he 
deals as opposed to tort cases in which no such choice exists.”17 As 
several courts have recognized,  
[t]he attempt to hold a parent corporation [liable] where the claim 
asserted is of contractual origin presents added difficulties. The very 
reasonable question must be met and answered why one who 
contracted with the subsidiary and received the promise which he 
bargained for but who has been disappointed in the fulfillment by 
the subsidiary of its commitment should be allowed to look to the 
parent. As a matter of contract right it is evident he may not. 
Additional compelling facts must appear.18 
In assessing whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts generally 
apply a range of factors, none of which by itself is sufficient to 
establish liability.19 These factors, however, tend to be designed to 
ascertain whether certain, more fundamental, elements are met. In 
order to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability, it is 
generally necessary to show that a parent or affiliated entity exercised 
domination or control over the entity at issue, that there was an 
element of fraud or abuse of the corporate form, and that the 
fraudulent abuse of the corporate form caused a tangible injury.20  
 
 17. Hickman v. Rawls, 638 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. App. 1982) (citing Hanson Corp. v. 
Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)); see also Edwards Co. v. 
Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 981 (5th Cir. 1984)); Cambridge Elecs. Corp. v. 
MGA Elecs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 313, 331 n.50 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts are less likely to 
apply the alter ego doctrine where the party seeking to invoke it . . . voluntarily transacted 
business with the corporate entity.” (citing Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 
1577 (10th Cir. 1990))). 
 18. Edwards Co., 730 F.2d at 981 (quoting Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 
431 S.W.2d 336, 339–40 (Tex. 1968)); see also Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 781 S.W.2d 618, 
623 (Tex. App. 1989) (“[C]ourts are more likely to disregard the corporate fiction in tort 
cases than in contract cases, like this one, because the risk of loss in a contract case is 
apportioned in prior dealings, when the bargain is first struck.” (citing Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at 
375)), rev’d on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1990). 
 19. See, e.g., W. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139 
(2d Cir. 1991) (listing factors); Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 
806, 813–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (listing factors). 
 20. Fletcher summarizes these requirements as follows:  
[C]ourts will disregard the existence of a corporate entity when the plaintiff shows: 
(1) control, not merely majority or complete stock control, but complete 
domination, not only of the finances, but of policy and business practice in respect 
to the transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time 
no separate mind, will or existence of its own; and (2) that such control was used by 
the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of the statutory 
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A. Domination and Control 
“Domination and control” means more than the ordinary 
control that accompanies the normal parent-subsidiary relationship. 
A parent corporation “may be directly involved in financing and 
macro-management of its subsidiaries . . . without exposing itself to a 
charge that each subsidiary is merely its alter ego.”21 Indeed, parent 
corporations are “almost always ‘active participants’” in the affairs of 
their subsidiaries, and in most circumstances such participation is 
“entirely permissible.”22 “Appropriate parental involvement includes: 
‘monitoring of the subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the 
subsidiary’s finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of 
general policies and procedures.’”23 Accordingly, the standard level 
of “control” accompanying a parent-subsidiary relationship is 
insufficient in itself to establish this prong of the veil piercing test. 
For “it is hornbook law that ‘the exercise of the “control” which 
stock ownership gives to the stockholders . . . will not create liability 
beyond the assets of the subsidiary.’”24 Something more is required. 
In order to establish alter ego liability or pierce the corporate 
veil, plaintiffs must show that the parent exercised “exclusive 
domination and . . . control to the point that [the subsidiary] no 
longer has legal or independent significance of [its] own.”25 “The 
parent’s general executive control over the subsidiary is not enough; 
rather there must be a strong showing beyond simply facts 
 
or other positive legal duty, or to commit a dishonest and unjust act in 
contravention of the plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and 
breach of duty proximately caused the injury or unjust loss. 
FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.10; see also Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: 
Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1994). 
 21. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 22. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 759 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Secon Serv. 
Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 415 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 23. Doe, 248 F.3d at 926 (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 
(1998)). 
 24. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 8, at 196). 
 25. Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 
n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc., C.A. No. 11514, 1992 WL 127567, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 28, 
1992)); see also Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183–84 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“‘[P]laintiffs 
must allege facts that, if taken as true, demonstrate the Officers’ and/or Parents’ complete 
domination and control of the [subsidiary].’” (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 
718 F. Supp. 260, 271 (D. Del. 1989))). 
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evidencing ‘the broad oversight typically indicated by [the] common 
ownership and common directorship’ present in a normal parent-
subsidiary relationship.”26 “As a practical matter, the parent must be 
shown to have moved beyond the establishment of general policy 
and direction for the subsidiary and in effect taken over performance 
of the subsidiary’s day-to-day operations in carrying out that 
policy.”27 Even “widespread involvement” in financial and 
management decisions is not sufficient to establish liability.28  
1. Corporate formalities  
Courts consider a number of factors in determining whether the 
requisite domination and control exists in a given case. One of the 
most frequently cited factors in determining whether there has been 
excessive domination or control is the corporation’s compliance with 
corporate formalities, such as maintaining separate corporate books, 
hiring an independent auditor, and maintaining an independent 
board that holds regular meetings.29 While this factor is frequently 
cited, it is not often dispositive given that “mere failure upon 
occasion to follow all the forms prescribed by law for the conduct of 
corporate activities will not justify [disregard of the corporate 
entity].”30  
 
 26. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Super. Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 838–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (brackets in original) (quoting Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 679 (E.D. Cal. 
1995)). 
 27. Id. (citing Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 679); see also Allen v. Oberdorfer Foundries, 
Inc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“The parent corporation must exercise 
complete domination and control of the subsidiary’s everyday operations.” (citing Pebble Cove 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Fid. N.Y. FSB, 153 A.D.2d 843 (N.Y. 1989))). 
 28. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 29. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.31 (noting that when courts determine 
whether corporate formalities were observed, they examine many factors including whether 
corporations were separately incorporated, had separate boards of directors, kept separate 
accounting and tax records, and had separate facilities and operating personnel); see also In re 
Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (N.D. Ala. 1993) 
(observing that corporate formalities include corporation’s “maintaining its own books; filing 
its own tax returns; hiring its own auditor; employing its own officers, management and 
workers; owning and operating its own plants . . . ; [and] holding its own stockholders’ and 
directors’ meetings”), vacated in part on other grounds, 884 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995); 
In re Acushnet River & New Bedrod Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 35 (D. Mass. 
1987). 
 30. Curtis v. Feurhelm, 335 N.W.2d 575, 576–77 (S.D. 1983) (brackets in original) 
(citing Larson v. Western Underwriters Inc., 77 S.D. 157, 167 (1958)); see also Thompson, 
supra note 1, at 18 (“The failure to follow corporate formalities has been questioned as a basis 
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Moreover, the lack of corporate formalities is arguably irrelevant 
unless it leads to improper “control” or “manipulation” of the 
subsidiary corporation. Without such manipulation or control, the 
nexus between the actions of one entity and another required to 
establish liability is lacking. Accordingly, adherence to corporate 
formalities is only one element in the analysis.  
2. Adequate capitalization 
A factor that is perhaps more important is whether the 
corporation has been adequately capitalized. Here too, however, 
there are appropriately stringent requirements for establishing the 
sort of inadequate capitalization that may support piercing the veil of 
limited liability. “‘Inadequate capitalization means capitalization very 
small in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and 
the risks attendant to such businesses.’”31 To fall below the requisite 
threshold, the capital “placed in the subordinate” must be “illusory 
or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of 
loss.”32 
Moreover, generally one must look to the capitalization of the 
corporation when it is formed—not during subsequent periods of 
operation. “‘A corporation that was adequately capitalized when 
formed, but which subsequently suffers financial reverses is not 
undercapitalized.’”33 Accordingly, “undercapitalization, when 
considered at all, is evaluated with emphasis on the time of 
 
for piercing in corporations generally and does not seem to have a direct effect on a large 
percentage of piercing cases.”). 
 31. Community Care Centers, Inc. v. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002) (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33). 
 32. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33; see also Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. 
de C.V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1957) (explaining that “undercapitalized” means that 
the amount of capital is “illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the 
risks of loss” (quoting BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 302–03 (rev. ed. 1976))). 
 33. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d at 565 (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33). While 
some courts have looked at “siphoning” of funds from one corporate entity to another as one 
factor in determining whether the veil should be pierced, most courts recognize that such 
transfers may be perfectly normal:  
Alter ego status cannot be inferred whenever a shareholder withdraws some monies 
from a corporation without formally declaring a dividend or executing a note even if 
one of the withdrawals is made while the corporation is insolvent. If it did, every 
payment to a stockholder during insolvency would justify piercing the corporate veil. 
Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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incorporation rather than thereafter.”34 In fact, some courts have 
held that “[t]he filing of articles of incorporation by the secretary of 
state may be conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all 
conditions precedent to incorporation, including adequate 
capitalization.”35 
While courts do not always clearly articulate the standards for 
assessing the adequacy of capitalization, in the bankruptcy context 
courts have developed standards for assessing the solvency of 
corporations entering the bankruptcy system that provide useful 
guidance. “Foremost among the standards” for determining whether 
a corporation is “undercapitalized” under this line of authority is 
“the opinion of a skilled financial analyst” regarding whether the 
corporation’s capital was “insufficient to support a business of the 
size and nature . . . in light of the circumstances existing at the time 
the [company] was capitalized.”36 
Courts applying these guidelines have made clear that it is 
improper to judge undercapitalization using hindsight.37 As these 
courts recognize, “[t]esting [undercapitalization] by hindsight will  
. . . turn up too many false positive results of undercapitalization.”38 
This is because “[o]wners owe no duty to recapitalize a failing firm, 
and courts should not introduce one through the back door by 
retrospectively finding undercapitalization by proof of ‘eventual 
failure.’”39 If such retroactive analysis is applied in judging the 
adequacy of capitalization, then “every firm that slips into insolvency 
can be termed undercapitalized.”40 
 
 34. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 
1988) (citing Consumer’s Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 218–19 
(Wis. 1988); DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 
1976)); see also In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 176 B.R. 223, 234 (M.D. Fla. 1994) 
(“[I]nadequate capitalization refers to the amount of capital provided to a subsidiary upon its 
formation.” (citing In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980))); FLETCHER, supra 
note 5, § 41.33 (“The adequacy of capital is to be measured as of the time of formation of the 
corporation. A corporation that was adequately capitalized when formed, but which 
subsequently suffers financial reverses is not undercapitalized.”).  
 35. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33 (citing Wilkerson v. Wegner, 793 P.2d 983 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 36. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 703 (5th Cir. 1977); see also In re Lifschultz 
Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 351–52; Secon Serv., 855 F.2d at 416; In re 
Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703. 
 38. In re Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 352. 
 39. Id. (quoting In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703). 
 40. Id. at 351–52. 
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Even where this factor applies, again, it is generally deemed 
insufficient by itself to establish alter ego liability.41 As the Seventh 
Circuit recently observed: “[W]e are unaware of any decision relying 
on undercapitalization alone as grounds for disregarding the 
corporate entity in a contract case . . . . A requirement to provide 
continuing capitalization, as [plaintiff] urges, probably would injure 
noncontrolling creditors rather than helping them, by precipitating 
unnecessary forced sales.”42 
Courts impose these stringent standards to avoid transforming 
veil piercing into a mechanism for holding a parent liable whenever 
the funds of its subsidiary are insufficient to pay a potential 
judgment.43 “[T]he mere fact that an entity may or may not have the 
capital to respond to a potential large award against it does not 
justify piercing the corporate veil.”44 Rather, undercapitalization is 
relevant only when it demonstrates that the corporate form is merely 
a sham. In a company that was adequately capitalized from the 
outset, subsequent losses that lead to a lack of adequate capital 
provide no such evidence.  
3. Intercompany transactions and commingling of assets 
Another factor courts frequently invoke in conducting a veil 
piercing analysis is whether there were inappropriate transactions 
among corporate entities. These intercompany transactions may be 
cited as evidence of “domination and control” or as a means for 
siphoning off funds from one corporate entity to another. 
Nonetheless, courts have been hesitant to place emphasis on this 
factor in determining whether to impose alter ego liability. As a 
number of courts have observed, “[t]ransactions between 
corporations are legitimate and commonplace, and, when between 
one company and another with a significant or even controlling 
 
 41. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 23 (lamenting the fact that “the strategist nearly 
always can prevail by undercapitalizing the company and making sure no other factors favoring 
disregard [of the corporate form] are present”). 
 42. Secon Serv. Sys., 855 F.2d at 416; see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 521 (noting 
“courts’ well-nigh universal refusal to treat undercapitalization, standing alone, as dispositive” 
when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil). 
 43. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128, 1138 
(N.D. Ala. 1993); see also Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 475 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). 
 44. Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F. Supp. 1005, 1020 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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stock ownership in the former, do not necessarily suggest improper 
domination or a failure of the parties to respect their separate 
corporate identities.”45  
Indeed, far from suggesting any domination or control of a 
corporate subsidiary, intercompany transactions may establish the 
independence of corporate entities. Courts have held, for example, 
that “[t]he fact that [a parent corporation] requires the subsidiaries 
to pay a fee” for services actually “supports [the parent’s] argument 
that it is not the alter ego of any of its subsidiaries.”46 Were corporate 
formalities ignored, such arms-length transactions would not exist. 
In contrast, commingling of assets may present a risk of an 
inappropriate alter ego relationship.47 Where a corporation 
commingles its assets with those of shareholders, courts are more 
likely to find that the corporation is not separate and distinct from its 
shareholders. Such commingling is distinct from typical corporate 
transactions—such as where a parent gives its subsidiary financing to 
conduct its business operations.48 
4. Overlap in officers and directors 
Litigants also occasionally point to an overlap in the leadership of 
corporate entities as evidence in support of piercing the corporate 
veil. However, as the Supreme Court has made clear, overlap in 
directors or officers among affiliated corporate entities is not 
unusual, and is generally held to be insufficient to establish alter ego 
liability alone:  
 
 45. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 837 F. Supp. at 1134. 
 46. Joiner v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis 
added); see also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 837 F. Supp. at 1135 (“[A]rrangements—
involving the payment of consideration for services rendered—during the formative years of a 
subsidiary’s existence do not suggest a degree of involvement by the parent that supports a 
claim for piercing the corporate veil many years later.”); Connors v. Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538, 
1568 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (no alter ego liability where “management fees were paid by 
[subsidiaries] for services rendered”). 
 47. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.50, at 246–47 (“Evidence that shareholders used 
corporate funds for personal purposes, mixed corporate and personal accounts, or commingled 
assets so that the ownership interests were indistinguishable will be weighed, along with other 
factors, when a disregard of corporate separateness is urged.”). 
 48. Id. at 249 (“In the parent/subsidiary context, a court will not pierce the corporate 
veil merely because the parent and subsidiary issued consolidated financial statements, or 
because the parent provided financing to the subsidiary.”). 
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[I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to 
serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve 
to expose the parent corporation to liability for its subsidiary’s  
acts . . . . This recognition that the corporate personalities remain 
distinct has its corollary in the “well established principle [of 
corporate law] that directors and officers holding positions with a 
parent and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’ to represent the 
two corporations separately, despite their common ownership.”49  
Thus, “[w]hile stock control and common directors and officers 
are generally prerequisites” for imposing alter ego liability, “they are 
not sufficient by themselves to bring the rule into operation.”50 
Indeed, “[p]arents and subsidiaries frequently have overlapping 
boards of directors while maintaining separate business 
operations.”51 In practice, therefore, this factor is not particularly 
useful, and certainly not dispositive, in determining whether the 
corporate veil should be pierced or alter ego liability imposed. 
5. Miscellaneous factors 
Finally, there are a number of miscellaneous factors that courts 
sometimes consider in assessing veil piercing claims, most of which 
are generally deemed to be of limited relevance. One such factor is 
the filing of consolidated financial statements or tax returns. 
However, courts have held that a parent corporation’s “decision to 
include [its subsidiary] in its consolidated tax return hardly 
demonstrates domination” and is insufficient to establish even a 
“prima facie” case to pierce the corporate veil.52 Similarly, courts “do 
not consider the fact of consolidated financial reports to be a 
sufficient basis to impose liability under the alter ego doctrine.”53 As 
 
 49. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998) (quoting Lusk v. Foxmeyer 
Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997) and Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 
F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 50. Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical, 324 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1963); see also 
Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 237 (D. Del. 1984) 
(holding that overlapping directors was insufficient to pierce veil); Scott-Douglas Corp. v. 
Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309, 314 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (same).  
 51. Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1460 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Calvert v. 
Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (“Courts have repeatedly held that [factors 
such as some interlocking directors and officers] do not justify piercing the corporate veil.”). 
 52. AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 53. Lowell Staats Min. Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 
1989). 
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with overlapping directors and corporate officers, “consolidating the 
activities of a subsidiary into the parent’s annual reports is a common 
business practice. It is allowed by both the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and it is 
recommended by generally accepted accounting principles.”54 
Another factor that courts sometimes consider is the operation of 
multiple corporate entities from a centralized location. While 
plaintiffs sometimes point to the fact that affiliated companies have 
the same corporate headquarters as evidence of “domination and 
control,” a number of courts have likewise noted that “‘[t]he 
separate corporate entities of two corporations may not be 
disregarded merely because one owns the stock of another or 
because the two share common directors or occupy the same office 
space.’”55 The physical location of the two entities is simply not 
particularly dispositive of whether they are alter egos. Moreover, 
there are many perfectly legitimate reasons two corporate entities 
may share a single physical location.  
B. Fraud and Misuse of the Corporate Form 
Not only must plaintiffs demonstrate “domination and control” 
in order to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability, 
but typically they also bear the burden of demonstrating that there 
was “misuse of the corporate form constituting fraud or promoting 
injustice.”56 Domination or control of a subsidiary by a corporate 
 
 54. Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 678–79; see also Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 
1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding no alter ego liability even though parent remained 
responsible for general policy, received money from subsidiaries that was funneled into 
centralized bank accounts, filed a consolidated tax return, and offered benefit plans to its 
subsidiaries’ employees); O'Berry v. McDermott, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Tex. App. 1986) 
(holding that overlapping directors and officers, filing consolidated tax returns, maintaining 
employee benefits for subsidiary, capitalizing and financing the subsidiary, making decisions for 
subsidiary, and being regarded by the public as one business unit was insufficient to establish 
alter ego relationship). 
 55. Hornsby v. Hornsby’s Stores, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
(quoting Sumner Realty Co. v. Willcott, 499 N.E.2d 554, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)); see also 
13-D Elec. Co., Inc. v. Barnett Constr. Co., 706 S.W.2d 135, 140 (Tex. App. 1986) 
(“Evidence that [two corporations] officed in the same building does not invoke the ‘alter ego’ 
theory.”). 
 56. Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1995); see also FLETCHER, supra note 
5, § 43, at 296 (“[A]lthough corporations are related, there can be no piercing of the veil 
without a showing of improper conduct.”); id. § 41.32 (“Some courts have required 
intentional misconduct, while others reiterate the more general requirement that there must be 
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parent is not sufficient. In order to pierce the corporate veil there 
must be “evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.”57 
The test in this regard is also particularly stringent. Only a 
specific kind of fraud or misrepresentation is sufficient to establish 
liability. 
[T]he act of one corporation is not regarded as the act of another 
merely because the first corporation is a subsidiary of the other, or 
because the two may be treated as part of a single economic 
enterprise for some other purpose. Rather, to pierce the corporate 
veil based on an agency or “alter ego”’ theory, “the corporation 
must be a sham and exist for no other purpose than as a vehicle for 
fraud.”58  
A corporation is not a “sham” or “vehicle for fraud” if it “engaged in 
substantial business operations.”59 In all but the most egregious cases 
this requirement will not be met.  
In particular, it is well established that “[t]he underlying cause of 
action does not supply the necessary fraud or injustice. To hold 
otherwise would render the fraud or injustice element meaningless, 
and would sanction bootstrapping.”60 Quite simply, “[t]he ‘injustice’ 
must be more than the breach of contract alleged in the 
complaint.”61 Likewise, “[m]ere use of the corporate form to avoid 
liability is insufficient to warrant piercing the veil.”62 There must be 
 
some form of deception, injustice, defeat of public policy, or fraudulent, improper or criminal 
purpose.”). 
 57. Extra Energy Coal Co. v. Diamond Energy and Res., Inc., 467 N.E.2d 439, 442 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923, 
927, 930–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Absent proof of intentionally fraudulent conduct, courts 
simply do not pierce the corporate veil . . . .”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, 718 F. Supp. 
260, 268 (D. Del. 1989). 
 58. In re Sunstates Corp. S’holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 534 (Del. Ch. 2001) (quoting 
Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)); see also Kaplin v. First Options of 
Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). 
 59. Sunstates Corp., 788 A.2d at 534. 
 60. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 268; see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, 
§ 41.32, at 200–02 (“A fraud or injustice which relates to ancillary activity is generally not a 
sufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil.”). 
 61. Outokumpu Eng’g Enters. v. Kvaerner EnviroPower, 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1996). 
 62. Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Exp. Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 704 (2d 
Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 982 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Radeszewski v. 
Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The doctrine of limited liability is 
intended precisely to protect a parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke.”); Zubik v. 
Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Limiting one’s personal liability is a traditional 
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evidence that the misuse of the corporate form perpetrated a fraud on 
the plaintiffs.63 
The requirement that the alleged misuse of the corporate form 
constitute a fraud or misrepresentation is particularly difficult to 
meet in contract cases. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Secon 
Service Systems, courts generally require “more than control to pierce 
the corporate veil for the benefit of contract creditors.”64 The reason 
for this is simple: “[U]nless the corporation engaged in some 
practice that might have misled its contract creditors into thinking 
they were dealing with another entity, there simply is no need to 
‘protect’ them.”65 This is because, “[u]nlike tort claimants, they 
chose to deal with the corporation; to allow them access to 
shareholders or parent corporations when the deal goes sour is to 
give them more than the benefit of their bargain.”66  
Even in cases that do not involve contract claims, plaintiffs 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil face a high burden. At a 
minimum, they must establish that the defendant’s conduct was 
somehow intentionally “wrongful”—i.e., that defendants committed 
some act “akin to fraud or deception.”67 Thus, parties seeking to 
establish liability must show that the “parent is employing the 
subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud or commit wrongdoing”; “[m]erely 
showing control” is “insufficient to overcome th[e] presumption” 
that corporate entities are separate.68  
These requirements are imposed for good reason. They ensure 
that the economic and legal benefits of limited liability will be 
preserved and will only be breached where there has been some 
abuse of the corporate form in a way that is not economically 
 
reason for a corporation.”); Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F. 
Supp. 1005, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he mere fact that an entity may or may not have the 
capital to respond to a potential large award against it does not justify piercing the corporate 
veil.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 269 (“The law requires that fraud or 
injustice be found in the defendants’ use of the corporate form.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923, 927, 930–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that courts 
generally “pierce the corporate veil only upon ‘proof of deliberate misuse of the corporate 
form—tantamount to fraud’”). 
 64. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 415 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
 65. Id. at 415–16. 
 66. Id. at 416. 
 67. Hystro Prods., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 68. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 43, at 289–92. 
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beneficial. In sum, the corporate veil may not be pierced based on 
“the mere prospect of an unsatisfied judgment.”69 If it could, the 
limited liability of the corporate form would be rendered 
meaningless.  
C. Causation 
Finally, in addition to complete domination and control and the 
use of the corporate form to commit fraud or some similar wrong, 
courts generally require that the fraud or wrong result in an actual 
injury to the plaintiff.70 For example, when misuse of the corporate 
form leads to undercapitalization and leaves plaintiffs without an 
adequate monetary remedy, there may be grounds for piercing the 
corporate veil.71 It is not enough that there was fraud or misuse of 
the corporate form; fraud or misuse must lead to a tangible injury to 
the plaintiffs.72 Thus, as in other areas of the law, there is a strong 
causation requirement. The law will not provide a remedy where 
there has been no injury.  
II. CRITICISMS OF THE VEIL PIERCING DOCTRINES 
These requirements for piercing the corporate veil have been 
criticized on all sides. Some commentators have argued that the 
requirements for veil piercing are too stringent and that it is unjust 
 
 69. Hystro Prods., 18 F.3d at 1390. 
 70. See, e.g., W. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 
138 (2d Cir. 1991); Morris v. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160–61 (N.Y. 
App. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs must show that “(1) the owner[] exercised complete 
domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked[] and (2) that such 
domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in 
plaintiff’s injury”); Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del. 
Ch. 1987). 
 71. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (citing L.S. Tellier, 
Annotation, Inadequate Capitalization as Factor in Disregard of Corporate Entity, 63 A.L.R. 
2d. 1051 (1959)). 
 72. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 306 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that there is no liability without harm); Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 375 
(Tex. 1985) (“If the corporation responsible for the plaintiffs’ injury is capable of paying a 
judgment upon proof of liability, then no reason would exist to attempt to pierce the corporate 
veil and have shareholders pay for the injury.”); see also Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 984 F. 
Supp. 830, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Courts do not pierce the corporate veil unless the 
‘corporation is so undercapitalized that it is unable to meet debts that may reasonably be 
expected to arise in the normal course of business.’” (quoting Laborers Clean-Up Contract 
Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 525 (9th Cir. 1984))). 
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to shield assets from potential claimants where a related enterprise 
may have received the benefits of the activity conducted by another 
enterprise.73 Others have argued that the veil piercing doctrines are 
harmful to economic progress and should be abandoned 
altogether.74  
A. Enterprise Liability and Other Doctrines Seeking to Erode the 
Requirements for Piercing the Corporate Veil 
The detractors of limited liability often argue that it allows 
corporations to externalize the costs of their risky activities to 
innocent third parties.75 A variety of academic commentators have 
advocated revising or even entirely abandoning the doctrine of 
limited liability. Proponents of such views often espouse some 
version of “enterprise liability” to replace the traditional 
requirements for piercing the corporate veil. Enterprise liability 
focuses upon the control element that is traditionally part of the veil 
piercing analysis.76 However, it eliminates or severely weakens the 
other requirements—i.e., that there be some fraud or misuse of the 
corporate form that actually causes an injury to the plaintiffs. 
Moreover, it seeks to erode the traditional “control” requirement 
itself. In the place of the “extraordinary” level of control that is 
required under traditional veil piercing analysis, some commentators 
hope to substitute the ordinary control that a parent corporation 
typically exercises over its subsidiary.77 In the place of limited 
 
 73. See, e.g., PHILIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2005) 
[hereinafter BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS]; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3. 
 74. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 534–35. 
 75. Id. at 494 (“A number of commentators have complained that limited liability 
permits investors to externalize the risks of modern industrial enterprise.”). The proponents of 
limited liability recognize this phenomenon, but have argued that “[t]he implications of this 
point . . . are unclear, both because modifying limited liability has its costs and because moral 
hazard would exist without limited liability.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 104. 
Moreover, they note that “there is no externality with respect to voluntary creditors.” Id. 
(citing Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
499, 503 (1976)). 
 76. See 1 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, § 10.03[E], at 10–11 
(stating that these doctrines “focus[] . . . on the common business, control, and extensive 
integration of operations and management of the enterprise”); Phillip I. Blumberg, Control 
and the Partly Owned Corporation: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Shared Control, 10 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 419, 424 (1996) (“Control plays a crucial role in the application of enterprise 
principles wherever they have been adopted in U.S. law.”). 
 77. See Blumberg, supra note 76, at 426, 460. 
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liability, some advocate enterprise liability as a form of strict liability 
that may be asserted against parent corporations for the actions of 
their subsidiaries. 
Other commentators have gone even further, openly advocating 
for the complete elimination of limited liability or at least the 
elimination of limited liability with respect to tort creditors.78 The 
rationale for such reforms is that limited liability allows shareholders 
to externalize the risks of their activities and shoulders innocent 
creditors with the burden. They contend, for example, that 
“[p]ermitting an enterprise to avoid the full costs of its activities 
creates incentives for excessive risk-taking.”79 They further argue that 
“limited liability in tort permits the firm’s owners to determine 
unilaterally how much of their property will be exposed to potential 
tort claims, thereby inviting opportunism and inefficiency.”80 In 
addition, some argue that shareholders may be superior risk-bearers 
given that they are able to diversify against firm-specific risks.81 
B. Calls for Abolition of the Veil Piercing Doctrine 
At the same time that many academics have argued for an 
expansion of corporate liability, other commentators have urged 
retention of the traditional standards or even abolition of the veil 
piercing doctrine in its entirety.82 One of the primary rationales for 
retention of the traditional stringent standards for piercing the 
corporate veil is the significant economic benefits associated with 
limited liability.83 Commentators have hailed limited liability as a 
 
 78. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1880; see also David W. Leebron, 
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1605 (1991) 
(observing that “the case for limited liability with respect to tort victims is far more tenuous” 
than for contract creditors). 
 79. Thompson, supra note 20, at 14. 
 80. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1880, 1920. 
 81. Thompson, supra note 20, at 17 (“A dominant argument for extending liability to 
shareholders rests on the superior risk-bearing ability of dispersed shareholders of public 
corporations.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 90–98; Presser, supra note 1, at 
407 (“It is, or at least once was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a 
parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or 
parent has somehow ‘abused’ the corporate form.”). 
 83. Professor Bainbridge has argued that even with respect to tort creditors who may 
have a stronger argument in favor of relaxation of the traditional standards, limited liability 
“can be justified on grounds that it increases the size of the pie out of which the tort creditors’ 
SMITH.FIN 10/20/2008 11:20 AM 
1165] Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries 
 1185 
significant source of economic growth in the United States as well as 
an important means by which ordinary citizens may have a chance to 
move up in the social ladder by starting small businesses unhampered 
by the significant threats and uncertainties associated with unlimited 
liability.84 Moreover, these commentators note that limited liability 
“is not unique to corporations” but is a general principle of law that 
spans across many different contexts: investors’ risk is typically 
limited to the amount of their investment, regardless of whether the 
corporate form is involved.85 Finally, they cite a number of less 
obvious economic benefits of limited liability such as encouraging 
diversification of equity ownership, ensuring that positive net value 
projects will not be rejected as “too risky,” and reducing monitoring 
costs.86 
In response to the critics of limited liability, these commentators 
argue that the long-recognized benefits of limited liability exceed any 
alleged costs. In particular, they observe that there is no externality 
with respect to contract creditors who voluntarily contract with the 
corporation. They also note that “[f]or all the academic controversy, 
the evidence is hardly overwhelming that limited liability causes a 
significant increase in a corporation’s willingness to engage in risky 
behavior.”87 The judiciary seems to share their view, as academic 
attacks on limited liability have gained little traction in the courts.88 
Most of these commentators, however, do not favor abandoning 
the traditional exceptions to limited liability under the veil piercing 
doctrines. They recognize that “the exceptions serve valuable 
 
claims may be satisfied by encouraging equity investment in corporations.” Bainbridge, supra 
note 2, at 497. 
 84. See supra note 2.  
 85. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 90. 
 86. See generally id. at 93–98. 
 87. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 421 (1992); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC 
Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 96 (arguing that “there is no reason to believe that veil 
piercing causes equity claimants to internalize the risks associated with their business’ 
operations” and that because of its vagueness, “[i]t seems unlikely that veil piercing even 
inadvertently addresses concerns over negative externalities”); Presser, supra note 1, at 410 
(arguing that it is “far from clear” that “by externalizing the costs of tortious behavior through 
limited liability, we will encourage corporations to engage in more hazardous behavior”); Larry 
E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 417, 439 (1992) (arguing that “the potential for externalities may be less than has been 
supposed”). 
 88. See Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 95. 
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functions” as well.89 However, they argue that the traditionally 
stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil are necessary to 
ensure the preservation of limited liability as the general rule and 
shareholder liability as the exception. Courts have tailored traditional 
standards to hold shareholders liable only where they are directly 
responsible for some wrongdoing or the corporate form is used as a 
sham to perpetrate a fraud. 
Nonetheless, other commentators go even further, arguing that 
limited liability should be strengthened by abolishing the veil 
piercing doctrines. They reason that “[t]he standards by which veil 
piercing is effected are vague, leaving judges great discretion.”90 As a 
result, they argue that there is “uncertainty and lack of predictability, 
increasing transaction costs for small businesses,” and that there is 
“no evidence that veil piercing has been rigorously applied to effect 
socially beneficial policy outcomes.”91 As these commentators 
observe, this vagueness and uncertainty “imposes substantial costs” 
because “litigation risks cannot be confidently predicted.”92 As a 
result, “parties can be deterred from engaging in socially desirable 
activities or, at the least, will take excessive [and costly] 
precautions.”93 
In place of the veil piercing theories, critics would substitute 
direct liability for shareholders who actively engage in wrongdoing.94 
Thus, shareholders would be ensured that they will not be subjected 
to liability unless they personally engage in some form of unlawful 
conduct. This approach dispenses entirely with the laundry list of 
factors typically employed in determining whether the corporate veil 
should be pierced and substitutes a form of direct liability for the 
indirect liability that occurs where the corporate veil has been 
pierced. 
While the veil piercing doctrines may not be the model of clarity 
and are often based on haphazard lists of factors that courts must 
 
 89. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 89. 
 90. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 481. 
 91. Id.; cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“The arbitrariness of the[] 
nominal tests [for piercing the corporate veil] casts further doubt on the utility of the 
doctrine.”). 
 92.  Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 514. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 481–82. 
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consider in determining whether to breach the corporate form,95 
there are some standards that emerge from the cases that may be 
used to enable more principled decision making. For example, as 
noted above, the factors that courts enumerate may in reality form 
categories of evidence demonstrating a handful of more fundamental 
elements. The courts generally require a high level of control by 
shareholders over the corporation whose veil is to be pierced as well 
as an element of fraud in the misuse of the corporate form that 
causes plaintiffs some tangible injury. While these more fundamental 
elements are not always applied in a principled manner, courts may 
rigorously apply the veil piercing doctrines if they adhere to these 
categories and requirements. 
Likewise, there are certain instances in which the veil piercing 
doctrines are more commonly utilized. Many commentators have 
noted that courts pierce the corporate veil more frequently in cases 
involving closely held corporations as opposed to large, publicly 
owned corporate entities.96 In such situations, the degree of direct 
shareholder control is likely to be greater and the potential for 
utilizing the corporate entity as a “sham” is increased.  
Similarly, commentators have theorized that veil piercing may be 
more common in the context of tort creditors, compared with 
contract creditors. Unlike contract creditors, tort creditors do not 
make a conscious decision to enter into a relationship with the 
subject corporation.97 While commentators have raised questions 
 
 95. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 
NW. U. L. REV. 140, 162 (1994) (“The law has never been very clear about what is the 
standard for piercing the corporate veil.”). 
 96. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“Almost every case in which a court 
has allowed creditors to reach the assets of shareholders has involved a close corporation.”); 
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1047 (1991); Thompson, supra note 20, at 9 (empirical study of 1600 veil piercing 
cases “found no case in which shareholders in a public corporation were held liable”); cf. 
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 503 (observing that “the tort creditor of the close corporation” is 
“the hardest case in which to justify limited liability” because “the shareholders of a close 
corporation frequently are actively engaged in the business on a full-time basis”). But see 
Leebron, supra note 78, at 1649 (arguing that “the case for limited liability of closely held 
corporations has been understated”). 
 97. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.85 (“[C]ourts are more likely to disregard the 
corporate entity in tort cases than in cases of contract because the injured party in contract 
cases had the opportunity to select the entity with whom he or she contracted; in a tort case, 
no such selection is made by a plaintiff.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 112 
(“Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract cases. The 
rationale for this distinction follows directly from the economics of moral hazard—where 
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regarding whether this theory is borne out in practice,98 it provides 
another means by which principled line drawing may achieve socially 
desirable outcomes. Finally, commentators have observed that the 
veil piercing doctrines are most often applied where the shareholders 
are active participants in wrongdoing.99 In such circumstances, the 
actions of the shareholders contribute to creditors’ loss and there is a 
stronger case for liability. Moreover, the shareholders in closely held 
corporations are more likely to undertake an active role in the 
conduct of the corporation, unlike the passive investors typical of 
most large, publicly held corporations who hold only a small 
minority interest in the firm and have a smaller stake in its 
operations.100 
At bottom, this Article is agnostic with respect to these 
criticisms. Whether veil piercing has become so haphazard and 
unprincipled that it serves no useful purpose or whether limited 
liability inefficiently and improperly shifts costs to unsuspecting 
creditors, there is one area in which commentators should be able to 
reach agreement. The benefits of limited liability outweigh any 
associated risks within certain industries in which the regulatory 
framework eliminates or mitigates the dangers associated with 
limited liability. Accordingly, the arguments made by critics of 
limited liability simply do not apply or are less significant under such 
circumstances. Similarly, those who wish to eliminate veil piercing 
doctrines in their entirety will approve this proposal as a welcome 
first step. 
 
corporations must pay for the risk faced by creditors as a result of limited liability, they are less 
likely to engage in activities with social costs that exceed their social benefits.”). 
 98. Compare Thompson, supra note 96, at 1058, 1068 (empirical study finding that the 
veil was more likely to be pierced in contract cases than in tort cases) with Presser, supra note 
2, at 167–68 (concluding based on a review of leading cases that “the veil is more likely to be 
pierced in tort than in contract cases”). 
 99. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 507 (“Minority shareholders who do not 
actively participate in the corporation’s business or management are rarely held liable on a veil 
piercing theory.”); Thompson, supra note 1, at 10; Thompson, supra note 20, at 9 (observing 
that empirical study of 1600 veil piercing cases “found . . . no civil case in which individual 
shareholders identified as passive in corporations of any size were held liable”).  
 100. In addition to these categories, some commentators have argued for greater veil 
piercing where the shareholder is a corporation. See Presser, supra note 2, at 173 (“There has 
long been a feeling on the part of some commentators . . . that it ought to be easier to pierce 
the veil in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship than in that of the individual 
shareholder and his or her corporation.”). 
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III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
While there has been significant disagreement over the extent to 
which courts should afford corporations the benefits of limited 
liability, there may be some areas in which all commentators can 
agree that it should be preserved. One such area is in the context of 
regulated industries in which the regulatory framework seeks to 
prevent the conduct the veil piercing doctrines seek to remedy. 
While there may be other industries in which such a rule may be 
appropriate,101 prime examples may be found in the insurance and 
banking industries. Insurance regulators in various states have 
developed a complex regulatory framework aimed at preventing the 
domination and control and fraudulent use of affiliated corporate 
entities. This comprehensive framework applies to the same sorts of 
factors the veil piercing doctrines identify. Likewise, federal 
regulators seek to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized and 
that where they function within holding company systems, 
intercompany transactions do not undermine their financial security. 
Accordingly, a prohibition on veil piercing where such regulatory 
frameworks exist may be warranted.  
Holding company systems composed of complex 
interrelationships among affiliated corporate entities are common in 
the insurance and banking industries and have significant advantages. 
For example, “[h]olding companies can provide subsidiaries with a 
level of financial flexibility, including capital infusions, access to 
capital markets, and in some cases, additional cash flow sources from 
other operations.”102 Such systems can also help the company 
“diversify risks” among different entities engaged in different lines of 
 
 101. Professor Blumberg has observed the following:  
Insurance has joined banking, savings and loan, public utilities, and casino gambling 
as the areas in American federal and state law in which the holding company and the 
corporate group are major subjects of regulatory concern. These statutes regulate 
the holding company systems conducting the regulated activities and extend the 
outer boundaries of statutory obligation to all component companies of the system 
whether or not the company itself is engaged in the regulated activities. Similarly, 
the statutes extend the regulatory program to apply statutory provisions regarding 
disclosure and regulation of transactions with “insiders” to all companies in the 
system and affiliated companies and interests as well. 
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent 
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 311 (1996); see also 3 
BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, §§ 120.01–120.06, 121.01–121.07, at 
120-1 to 120-56 (discussing firewalls between banks and affiliated entities).  
 102. Preface, 2004 Best’s Insurance Reports—Life/Health, at xiii. 
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business.103 In addition, they can allow specialization among 
different corporate entities within the same system, utilizing 
subsidiaries dedicated to providing investment management or other 
corporate services. This division of labor is advantageous for all 
entities within the holding company system, which benefit from the 
efficiencies and reduced costs associated with this structure.104 
Finally, holding companies can be advantageous from a tax 
perspective; by combining losses and gains from different 
subsidiaries, all companies may benefit through reduction in tax 
liabilities.105 Accordingly, there are many advantages associated with 
holding company systems that make them an ideal structure within 
the insurance, banking, and other industries.  
A. The Insurance Industry 
Regulators in the insurance industry have sought to preserve the 
significant benefits of holding company systems while regulating the 
potential hazards associated with intercompany relationships. In the 
process, they have developed regulatory frameworks on a state-by-
state basis founded on model laws that closely track the potential 
hazards that veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy. 
Accordingly, each state has developed detailed regulations for 
monitoring the interactions among insurance companies that operate 
within their jurisdiction.  
1. Insurance holding company acts 
Within this regulatory framework, each state has a Holding 
Company Act that imposes certain requirements on the parent of an 
insurance subsidiary. The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (“NAIC”), an organization comprised of insurance 
regulators in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that was 
established to ensure cooperation and coordination among the state 
regulators,106 has promulgated a Model Insurance Company System 
 
 103. Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 789, 823 (1979). 
 104. See id. at 819. 
 105. See id. at 818. 
 106. See generally 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, § 128.01, at 
128-5 (observing that the NAIC “plays a significant role in the coordination of state 
regulation”); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 635 
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Regulatory Act that has been substantially enacted in nearly all 
states.107  
Among other things, the statutes require disclosure and approval 
of changes in control of an insurer as well as material transactions 
and relationships between the insurer and the insurer’s affiliates.108 
They also provide standards governing material transactions between 
the insurer and the insurer’s affiliates.109 As a result, “[r]egulators 
have access to the most direct and detailed information on individual 
insurers through the filings made with the states. These include 
annual and quarterly statements, MD&A, audited financial 
statements, and filings made pursuant to the state’s Holding 
Company Act and other regulatory filings.”110 Using these 
submissions, regulators can easily monitor companies’ conduct and 
police the interactions among corporate entities within a holding 
company system. 
The various state departments of insurance scrutinize insurance 
subsidiaries’ conduct to prevent them from, among other things, 
entering into transactions or relationships with affiliated companies 
on terms that are not fair and reasonable or paying dividends to 
shareholders that jeopardize the financial condition of the insurer. 
Hence, insurers must file an Insurance Holding Company System 
Registration Statement with their domestic regulators containing 
current information regarding their various corporate structures, 
financial conditions, and relationships among related companies. 
Such relationships include, among other things, investments, 
management and service contracts, cost-sharing arrangements, 
 
(1999) (discussing role of the NAIC in insurance regulation and observing that it “has 
increasingly assumed a national role, centralizing many basic regulatory functions and 
operating as a quasi-federal agency by attempting to enforce national standards”). 
 107. See Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act, in 3 NAIC, MODEL LAWS 
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 440-1 to 440-58 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. For 
examples of the Model Act as enacted in various states, see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1215–1215.16 
(West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-129 to -140 (2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 5001–15 (1999); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/131.1 to .28 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 
27-1-23-1 to -13 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 206–206(D) (1998); and TEX. INS. 
CODE ANN. § 823.001–.503 (Vernon 2007).  
 108. See MODEL ACT §§ 3, 5, at 440-4 to -9, 440-16 to -20.  
 109. See id. § 5, at 440-16 to -20; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra 
note 73, § 128.09, at 128-28 (“IHCSRA § 5(A)(1) and virtually all the state statutes establish 
far-reaching standards for transactions within the holding company system.”). 
 110. NAIC, FRAMEWORK FOR INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY ANALYSIS 24 (March 
2002). 
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reinsurance agreements, and tax allocation agreements.111 The 
insurer must amend its registration statement whenever a new 
affiliated transaction is executed.112  
In addition, insurance holding company statutes require a 
domestic insurer that is a member of an insurance holding company 
system to provide regulators with notice of its intent to complete a 
“material” transaction with an affiliated entity. Insurers may only 
complete such transactions if the state department of insurance has 
not disapproved the transactions within thirty days of receiving 
notice.113 “Material” transactions include reinsurance agreements, 
management agreements, service contracts, cost-sharing agreements, 
certain kinds of loans, or any other transaction that the regulators 
determine could impact the insurer’s policyholders.114 Likewise, an 
insurer must provide notice to regulators of all dividends paid to 
another corporate entity within the holding company system and 
must gain approval for dividends of “extraordinary” magnitude.115  
States will not approve material transactions with an affiliate and 
will not allow shareholder dividends unless the transactions or 
dividends leave the insurer with surplus that is reasonable in relation 
to its outstanding liabilities. Regulators follow a set of statutorily 
prescribed factors to determine whether an insurer’s surplus is 
adequate and reasonable, which include: 
The size of the insurer as measured by its assets, capital and surplus, 
reserves, premium writings, insurance in force and other 
appropriate criteria . . . . The quality, diversification, and liquidity 
 
 111. MODEL ACT § 4(B), at 440-14 to -15. 
 112. Id. § 4(A)(3), at 440-14. 
 113. Id. § 5(A)(2), at 440-17; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 
73, § 128.09, at 128-29 (discussing requirements). 
 114. MODEL ACT § 5(A), at 440-17 to -18.  
 115. Id. §§ 4(E), 5(B), at 440-15, 440-18 to -19. The Model Act provides in relevant 
part: 
[A]n extraordinary dividend or distribution includes any dividend or distribution of 
cash or other property, whose fair market value together with that of other 
dividends or distributions made within the preceding twelve (12) months exceeds 
the lesser of: (1) Ten percent (10%) of the insurer’s surplus as regards policyholders 
as of the 31st day of December next preceding; or (2) The net gain from operations 
of the insurer, if the insurer is a life insurer, or the net income, if the insurer is not a 
life insurer, not including realized capital gains, for the twelve-month period ending 
the 31st day of December next preceding, but shall not include pro rata 
distributions of any class of the insurer’s own securities.  
Id. § 5(B), at 440-19. 
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of the insurer’s investment portfolio . . . . The recent past and 
projected future trend in the size of the insurer’s investment 
portfolio . . . . The surplus as regards policyholders maintained by 
other comparable insurers . . . . The adequacy of the insurer’s 
reserves . . . . [And] [t]he quality and liquidity of investments in 
affiliates.116 
Moreover, states specifically scrutinize transactions to ensure that the 
terms are “fair and reasonable”—i.e., that excessive fees are not 
charged, and that the transactions are properly accounted for.117  
Because the states, and not the federal government, have 
traditionally regulated insurance companies, an insurer engaging in a 
material transaction with an affiliate must not only satisfy its 
domestic regulator, but must also meet the approval of the affiliate’s 
domestic regulator. Similarly, different regulatory entities must give 
their approval before a company’s funds may be paid as dividends up 
through the corporate chain. Accordingly, each transaction may be 
subject to multiple layers of review, thereby ensuring that 
corporations within the holding company system are not subject to 
undue domination or control and that they are not employed as 
mere “sham” corporate entities. The Holding Company Act 
authorizes insurance commissioners to conduct periodic 
examinations to ensure that companies are complying with the 
regulatory requirements.118 
The NAIC publishes guidelines to coordinate efforts among 
authorities responsible for regulating holding company systems that 
aid regulators in obtaining “a general understanding of the 
consolidated holding company structure and assess[] current and/or 
 
 116. Id. § 5(D), at 440-20. 
 117. Id. § 5, at 440-16. The Model Act contains other optional provisions designed to 
lessen the dangers of excessive domination and control. For example, the Act provides that:  
[n]ot less than one-third of the directors of a domestic insurer, and not less than 
one-third of the members of each committee of the board of directors of any 
domestic insurer shall be persons who are not officers or employees of the insurer or 
of any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the insurer 
and who are not beneficial owners of a controlling interest in the voting stock of the 
insurer or entity. 
Id. § 5(C)(3), at 440-19; see also id. § 5(C)(4) (requiring the establishment of a committee of 
independent directors that shall be responsible for recommending the selection of independent 
certified public accountants and reviewing the insurer’s financial condition and the results of 
any independent or internal audits). 
 118. Id. § 6, at 440-21; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, 
§ 128.15, at 128-48 to -51 (2005) (discussing examination procedures). 
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potential risks to the insurance affiliates.”119 This multi-layer 
regulatory framework that monitors the relationship between 
companies functioning within insurance holding company systems 
“focuse[s] on ‘walling off’ the insurance company from the holding 
company” through “examinations of insurance companies on a state 
by state basis.”120 
2. Regulation of insurance subsidiaries 
Insurance subsidiaries are also subject to direct regulation and 
supervision by the insurance regulatory agencies of the states in 
which they transact business. Each state has an insurance company 
act that imposes certain regulatory requirements on the insurance 
subsidiary wholly apart from their transactions within a holding 
company system. State laws establish supervisory agencies with broad 
regulatory authority, including the power to: (1) grant and revoke 
business licenses; (2) regulate and supervise trade practices and 
market conduct; (3) establish guaranty associations; (4) license 
agents; (5) approve policy forms; (6) approve premium rates for 
some lines of business; (7) establish reserve requirements; (8) 
prescribe the form and content of required financial statements and 
reports; (9) determine the reasonableness and adequacy of statutory 
capital and surplus; (10) perform financial, market conduct, and 
other examinations; (11) define acceptable accounting principles; 
(12) regulate the type and amount of permitted investments; and 
(13) limit the amount of dividends and surplus debenture payments 
that can be paid without obtaining regulatory approval. Insurance 
subsidiaries are subject to periodic examinations by state regulatory 
authorities pursuant to such provisions.  
In particular, the regulators closely monitor the insurance 
subsidiary’s capitalization. Companies are required to file annual 
statutory financial statements in the departments of insurance for the 
states in which they engage in the business of selling and servicing 
insurance policies. Regulators in each of these jurisdictions use such 
financial statements along with other information in scrutinizing the 
financial condition of the insurance subsidiary to ensure that it meets 
capital, surplus, and reserve requirements on an ongoing basis.  
 
 119. NAIC, supra note 110, at 28. 
 120. Id. at 26. 
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State statutes require companies to file annual financial 
statements with their domestic regulators.121 Such financial 
statements must be independently audited and must include, among 
other things, the following information: “(1) [t]he report of the 
insurer’s independent auditor[;] (2) [a] balance sheet reporting 
admitted assets, liabilities, capital, and surplus[;] (3) [a] statement of 
operations[;] (4) [a] statement of cash flow[; and] (5) [a] statement 
of changes in capital and surplus.”122  
State insurance regulations also require each insurer to prepare 
and file an actuarial memorandum opining on the adequacy of the 
company’s reserves.123 Each memorandum presents a detailed 
analysis of the assumptions used to project future liabilities, the 
assumptions used to project future earnings, and whether expected 
future earnings plus reserves exceed expected liabilities. State 
regulators scrutinize the actuarial memorandum’s conclusions 
carefully and sometimes hire outside experts to determine the 
reasonableness of a memorandum. As an added layer of oversight, 
state departments of insurance perform periodic market conduct 
examinations of insurers doing business in their state. As part of 
these examinations, the regulators often examine, among other 
things, the propriety of an insurer’s transactions within its holding 
company system.  
On the basis of statutory statements filed with state regulators 
annually, the NAIC calculates certain financial ratios to assist state 
regulators in monitoring the financial condition of insurance 
companies. The NAIC’s risk-based capital (“RBC”) standards 
establish capital requirements for insurance companies based on the 
ratio of the company’s total adjusted capital (defined as the total of 
its statutory capital, surplus, asset valuation reserve and certain other 
adjustments) to its RBC. The standards are designed to help identify 
companies that are undercapitalized and require specific regulatory 
actions in the event an insurer’s RBC ratio falls below specified 
levels. 
 
 121. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/136 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-1 
(1999); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 802.001 (Vernon 2007). 
 122. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-7 (1999). 
 123. See 50 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 1408.10 (2008); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-
57-1 to -10 (2008); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1601 (2008). 
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B. The Banking Industry 
The banking industry has a similar regulatory framework that 
protects against the potential hazards associated with intercompany 
relationships. While regulation of banks is done primarily on the 
federal rather than the state level,124 regulators closely monitor the 
same risks posed by intercompany transactions to ensure the financial 
stability of banks and other entities operating within holding 
company systems.125 
1. The Bank Holding Company Act 
The Bank Holding Company Act governs holding company 
systems in the banking industry and imposes certain requirements for 
entities seeking to operate as bank holding companies. Among the 
factors considered by the Federal Reserve in determining whether an 
entity qualifies to function as a bank holding company are the 
financial strength of the entity and whether it is adequately 
capitalized.126 By regulating entry into the industry, the Act provides 
regulators with powerful tools to ensure that holding company 
systems are financially sound and to protect against corporate entities 
that are designed to function as mere sham corporations or to 
function in a fraudulent manner.  
Federal law also imposes regulatory requirements that apply to 
the operations of the holding company and its subsidiaries. Among 
other things, the Act imposes restrictions regarding intercompany 
transactions that are similar to those found in the insurance industry. 
Within a holding company structure, transactions among corporate 
entities are subject to significant regulation to ensure that these 
entities conduct transactions on an arms-length basis.  
The Federal Reserve Act likewise provides several safeguards to 
ensure the financial stability of regulated banking entities. Section 
23A of the Act places restrictions on a variety of transactions, 
including loans, purchases of securities and other assets, and 
 
 124. There are also state regulations that mirror the provisions of the Bank Holding 
Company Act. See generally 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, 
§§ 121.03[C], 123.04[B], 123.05, 123.06–.10, at 123-13 to -42. 
 125. See id. § 121.05, at 121-36 (“The general thrust of bank holding company 
regulation is to bolster the safety and soundness regulation of the banks they own.”). 
 126. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.14(c) (2007). 
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accommodations between banks and their affiliates.127 There is a 
quantitative restriction on the total amount of transactions among 
affiliates: they may not exceed twenty percent of bank capital and 
surplus. Moreover, § 23A prohibits transactions amounting to more 
than ten percent of capital and surplus with any affiliate.128 There are 
also qualitative restrictions to ensure that banks comply with safe and 
sound banking practices.129 Likewise, § 23B of the Act requires that 
bank holding companies complete other transactions on an arm’s 
length basis.130 These requirements are designed to prevent self-
dealing among affiliated entities and to ensure the continued 
financial stability of regulated entities.  
The regulations also impose capital restrictions that are designed 
to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized.131 Thus, much like 
the regulations governing the insurance industry, a key function of 
the regulations is to ensure that none of the corporate entities in a 
holding company system are undermined through intercompany 
transactions. In addition, the regulations specifically provide that 
holding companies must refrain from any actions that “constitute[] a 
serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a 
subsidiary bank.”132 Indeed, the regulations go so far as to suggest 
that a bank holding company must maintain financial resources to 
assist its subsidiaries if necessary and “serve as a source of financial 
and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks.”133  
As in the insurance industry, regulators have significant powers 
to undertake reviews to ensure banks meet these regulatory 
requirements. The Bank Holding Company Act, for example, 
provides for inspection of records in order to ensure that the 
regulatory requirements are met.134  
 
 127. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000). 
 128. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(8). 
 129. See id. § 371c(a)(4), (b)(10), (c)(1)–(2). 
 130. See id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 131. 12 C.F.R. § 225 App. A (2007); see generally 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE 
GROUPS, supra note 73, § 121.01, at 121-4 (“[T]he bank holding company regulatory 
scheme seems to take an entity approach when it requires individual banks to be capitalized in 
accordance with regulatory guidelines or when it requires banks to be formed and maintained 
in accordance with special rules designed to respect the integrity of the bank as a separate 
entity within the holding company structure.”). 
 132. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(2) (2007). 
 133. Id. § 225.4(a)(1). 
 134. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2000); see also 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra 
note 73, § 123.13[A], at 123-49 (“The federal statutes . . . provide the federal regulatory 
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2. Regulation of banking and other subsidiaries 
Likewise, as in the insurance industry, there are regulations 
governing the financial subsidiaries of national banks. Under the 
National Bank Act, the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate 
the charters for national commercial banks.135 Among the factors 
regulators consider in determining whether to grant a charter are the 
adequacy of the bank’s capital structure and its financial history and 
condition.136 In determining whether a bank may become a member 
of the Federal Reserve System, regulators look at similar factors, 
including the financial history of the bank and the adequacy of its 
capital structure.137  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act loosened the restrictions on the 
activities in which banks or their affiliates may engage, but at the 
same time provided that a national bank must have reasonable 
procedures and policies designed to preserve the bank’s limited 
liability by separating the bank from its financial subsidiaries.138 In 
addition, the Act requires financial subsidiaries of banks to comply 
with the restrictions on transactions among corporate entities found 
in §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.139 Finally, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act further provides that the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC shall issue 
“prudential safeguards” to ensure that transactions within the 
holding company structure are appropriate.140  
Thus, as in the insurance industry, there are multiple layers of 
regulation seeking to ensure the independence of corporate entities 
functioning within a holding company system. While the regulation 
in the banking industry occurs primarily at the federal level, many of 
the goals and effects of the regulatory system are the same. As a 
result, the regulatory framework in the banking industry, as in the 
 
authorities with broad powers of supervision, and they do so on a pervasive enterprise basis. 
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Fed has the power to require reports and examine 
bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, bank and nonbank, federally chartered or state 
chartered.”). 
 135. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
 136. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(i)(A)–(E) (2007). 
 137. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 208.5(a)(1) (2007). 
 138. 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2000). 
 139. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000). 
 140. 12 U.S.C. § 1828a (2000). 
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insurance industry, ensures that many of the potential dangers that 
veil piercing is designed to remedy do not occur.  
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR SOME MODEST LIMITATIONS ON VEIL 
PIERCING CLAIMS 
Compliance with such regulations, in essence, demonstrates that 
the requirements that are typically cited in veil piercing cases cannot 
be met. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that applying the 
veil piercing doctrines in such regulated industries is simply 
inappropriate. At a minimum, the regulators’ judgment that an 
entity has complied with these requirements should be entitled to 
significant judicial deference.141 “Where an agency is charged with 
responsibility for regulating a complex industry, it is much better 
equipped than the courts, ‘by specialization, by insight gained 
through experience, and by more flexible procedure,’ to gather the 
relevant facts that underlie a particular claim involving that 
industry.”142 Indeed, courts have long recognized that, in general, 
deference is warranted given such agencies’ “expertise in 
ascertaining, interpreting and distilling the facts and circumstances 
underlying the legal issues.”143 Moreover, “[w]here . . . a regulatory 
agency possesses such extensive authority and control over a 
particular subject matter, and where consideration of the same 
subject matter is sought before that agency and the courts, the 
possibility of a judicial-administrative conflict should be avoided.”144 
 
 141. Courts generally give such regulatory determinations significant deference. See, e.g., 
Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152, 157–58 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Simi Corp. v. Garamendi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Yamaha 
Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1998)) (noting that 
courts “giv[e] deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances 
of the agency action”); In re Comm’r’s Failure to Adopt 861 CPT Codes, 817 A.2d 355, 363 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“This court allows substantial deference to the 
interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing an act. Particularly in the insurance field, 
the expertise and judgment of the Commissioner may be allowed great weight.”) (citations 
omitted); Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 614 A.2d 1086, 1093 (Pa. 1992) 
(“[G]reat deference in favor of the Insurance Commissioner and the resulting narrow scope of 
review for the courts are in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency or 
individual officer assigned the task of regulating a given industry.”). 
 142. Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d at 157 (citing Far E. Conference v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citing Carter v. AT&T Co., 365 F.2d 486, 495 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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Federalism concerns may also counsel in favor of strong 
deference where a suit is brought in the federal courts seeking to 
pierce the veil of a state-regulated entity. The deference accorded 
state insurance regulators by the federal courts is particularly strong 
given that “[i]nsurance regulation has long been recognized as an 
area of traditional state concern.”145 Thus, federal courts in a variety 
of contexts have recognized “a strong federal policy of deferring to 
state regulation of the insurance industry.”146 
Economic theory suggests that the veil piercing theories are 
counterproductive in regulated industries such as insurance and 
banking. In such industries, all of the benefits of limited liability may 
be realized while at the same time largely dispensing with the 
associated costs. Because the regulatory framework seeks to prevent 
the same conduct that veil piercing doctrines were designed to 
remedy, it provides a ready substitute for mitigating the potential 
costs of limited liability. Moreover, entities operating in such 
industries already incur the costs associated with reducing the 
hazards of intercompany interactions; it makes no sense to incur 
both the costs of veil piercing and those of the regulatory structure. 
Because the costs of regulation are already being incurred, it makes 
sense to eliminate the duplicative set of costs attributable to veil 
piercing. 
The strong arguments in favor of abandoning veil piercing in 
such regulated industries appear to be borne out in practice where 
there seems to be a de facto, albeit largely unrecognized, prohibition 
on such claims. Given the heavily regulated nature of the industry 
and rigid separation imposed upon regulated entities, for example, it 
is not surprising that courts routinely reject attempts to pierce the 
corporate veil of entities operating in the insurance industry.147 
 
 145. Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 146. Murff v. Prof’l Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wolfson 
v. Mutual Benenfit Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 141, 147 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 147. See, e.g., Nobles v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Servs., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (M.D. Ala. 
2004) (holding that there was “no evidence” that parent controlled operations of insurance 
subsidiary); Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002); Forest v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 2001 WL 1338809, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. June 12, 2001) (“The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist 
to support the alter ego argument and [the insurance company’s parent] is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”); Bejcek v. Allied Life Fin. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 
(S.D. Iowa 2001) (rejecting argument that parent was alter ego of insurance company on 
ground that “[d]efendants’ alter-ego argument is without merit”); Smith v. S&S Dundalk 
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Likewise, veil piercing seems to be exceedingly rare in the banking 
industry.148 However, these decisions are utterly devoid of any 
theoretical analysis regarding the inappropriateness of applying alter 
ego principles in such regulated industries. Rather, courts typically 
apply the standard multifactor analysis used in other veil piercing 
cases. Nonetheless, a more general analysis of these factors dictates 
that alter ego liability is, at a more fundamental level, inappropriate 
in such regulated industries. The regulatory environment in which 
such companies operate undercuts any theory of alter ego liability in 
several ways.  
A. The Relationship Between Traditional Requirements for Piercing 
the Corporate Veil and the Regulatory Framework 
The traditional standards for piercing the corporate veil have 
little application in the heavily regulated insurance and banking 
industries. Indeed, the regulatory framework of these industries act 
to assuage traditional veil piercing concerns such as domination and 
control, capitalization, questionable inter-corporate transactions, and 
commingling of assets. 
1. Domination and control 
As noted above, veil piercing typically requires “complete 
domination ‘in respect to the transaction attacked’ so that the [other 
defendants] had ‘at the time’ no separate will of [their] own.”149 
However, the series of “legal firewalls” between the holding 
company and its affiliated entities found in the insurance and 
banking industries, for example, effectively prohibits any improper 
 
Eng’g Works, Ltd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.N.J. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss in favor 
of insurance company parent); Jemez Agency, Inc. v. CIGNA Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1340 
(D.N.M. 1994); Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
 148. See, e.g., Bentler v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, No. 88-6271, 1989 
WL 150139, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1989); Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 
685 (7th Cir. 1981); Reinke v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 4:04-CV-1758, 2005 WL 3454428 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2005); Guining Li v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 99-C-635-C, 2000 WL 
34237511, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2000); Leuthold v. Camp, 273 F. Supp. 695, 702 (D. 
Mont. 1967); Main Bank of Chi. v. Baker, 427 N.E.2d 94, 101–02 (Ill. 1981); Richardson v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 643 S.E.2d 410, 421–22 (N.C. App. Ct. 2007). But cf. In re Jarax Int’l, 
Inc., 122 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (piercing veil to reach subsidiary of parent bank). 
 149. Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio RR, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (App. Div. 1936)). 
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domination or control. Because regulators closely monitor 
transactions among corporations on an ongoing basis, the dangers of 
inappropriate intercompany interactions are significantly mitigated. 
Likewise, an important aspect of this regulatory scheme is a 
comprehensive system of financial reporting and accounting that is 
dictated by statute and regulation. The reporting requirements in the 
insurance industry, for example, include extensive annual statements 
that disclose all of the company’s revenues, expenses, obligations, 
and assets. These disclosures include a listing of each investment and 
its risk rating as determined by the NAIC.150 The regulations ensure 
that an insurance company is not a mere “shell,” as alter ego liability 
requires, but a distinct corporate entity whose obligations are backed 
by substantial assets.  
Moreover, the regulators in such industries monitor companies 
to ensure that they observe corporate formalities and that any 
overlap in corporate board or officers does not lead to any undue 
influence or control. Thus, the regulatory regime at the same time 
acknowledges the utility of the holding company structure and puts 
in place checks and balances to ensure that it is not abused. While 
the regulators’ primary purpose in monitoring such entities may be 
to protect the interests of policyholders or deposit holders, this 
regulatory structure has more wide-ranging benefits in preventing 
fraud or abuse of the corporate form. 
2. Adequate capitalization 
The regulatory framework likewise seeks to ensure that corporate 
entities are adequately capitalized. Insurance regulators, for example, 
using their own conservative benchmarks, set capitalization 
requirements for insurance companies and then monitor the finances 
of these companies to assess the adequacy of their capital. Regulators 
are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the solvency of the 
subsidiary corporate entities. When there are concerns about a 
company’s finances, regulators may intervene to ensure that the 
company retains sufficient funds to meet its obligations to 
policyholders. As a result, the regulatory framework ensures that 
companies are adequately capitalized, thereby undermining a key 
component of alter ego liability.  
 
 150. See 215 ILL. COMP. ANN. 5/136 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-1 (1999); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 802.052–.056 (Vernon 2007). 
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In particular, the regulators monitor transactions that may 
impact a company’s working capital. For example, a company may be 
required to give notice of ordinary dividends and to receive approval 
for extraordinary dividends. The regulators may also require 
dividends to be drawn from surplus capital.151 And the regulators 
may not allow a company to “make any payments in the form of 
dividends or otherwise” unless it “possess[ed] assets in the amount 
of such payment, in excess of its liabilities, including its capital 
stock.”152 In approving corporate dividends, regulators specifically 
consider “whether an insurer’s surplus is reasonable in relation to the 
insurer’s outstanding liabilities and adequate to its financial 
needs.”153 In doing so, regulators ensure that corporate entities 
remain adequately capitalized.  
Likewise, the capitalization of banks is closely monitored by 
regulators.154 Holding companies are prohibited from taking actions 
that may undermine a subsidiary’s financial resources or “financial 
safety” and “soundness.”155 Piercing the corporate veil in regulated 
industries would require courts to second-guess the judgment of 
these regulators.  
3. Inter-corporate transactions 
Like the veil piercing doctrines, the regulatory framework in the 
insurance and banking industries also acts to prevent improper 
transactions between a parent company and its subsidiaries. Indeed, 
the extent to which these regulatory frameworks prevent improper 
domination or control is impressive. Because each material 
transaction between corporate entities is subject to oversight, these 
frameworks can be particularly effective in preventing abuse of the 
corporate form. As noted above, for example, insurance regulations 
strictly limit the movement of capital from an insurance subsidiary to 
a holding company or its affiliates. These regulations prohibit 
insurance companies from paying dividends beyond a specified level 
without obtaining prior regulatory approval and require regulatory 
 
 151. See MODEL ACT § 4(E), 5(B), at 440-15, 440-18 to -19. 
 152. Id. 
 153. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-4(f) (1999).  
 154. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.14(b), 225 App. A (2007). 
 155. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(2) (2007). 
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approval of agreements between insurance companies and their 
affiliates.156  
Regulators therefore prohibit the sort of “siphoning” of funds 
from a holding company through dividends or exorbitant 
administrative or investment advisory fees that plaintiffs may allege in 
attempting to pierce the corporate veil. The dividends paid upstream 
through the holding company system are registered and, in some 
instances, approved by multiple regulatory entities. Moreover, the 
regulators review and approve each intercompany payment and 
transfer and each affiliate agreement that plaintiffs might cite in an 
attempt to establish an alter ego relationship. These regulators 
review investment advisory agreements, administrative services 
agreements, and tax sharing agreements to determine whether all of 
the agreements are “fair and reasonable” and based on arm’s-length 
transactions.157  
Likewise, regulators monitor transactions in bank holding 
company systems to ensure that they are consistent with sound 
banking policy and are conducted on an arms-length basis.158 The 
regulatory framework is specifically designed to ensure that 
transactions among related entities are not used to undermine 
banking subsidiaries, and indeed the regulations specifically preclude 
extensive intercompany transactions by placing quantitative 
limitations on the amount of such transactions.159  
4. Commingling of assets 
Finally, regulations may also prevent the “commingling of 
assets” that is a standard element of veil piercing claims. Affiliated 
entities in the insurance industry, for example, typically have their 
own separate bank accounts and accounting records. Premiums 
received from policyholders are deposited, maintained, and 
controlled by the entity that holds the policies. Commissions to 
agents are disbursed from accounts the company owns and controls. 
 
 156. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-23-1.5, 23-4 (1999). 
 157. Such intercompany transactions are not uncommon in the insurance industry. 
“Insurance subsidiaries generally fund debt service and other obligations of their holding 
company through a combination of dividends, tax sharing payments and other expense 
allocation agreements with their holding company.” 2004 Best’s Insurance Reports—
Life/Health, at xiii. 
 158. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000). 
 159. See id. § 371c(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(8). 
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Regulatory audits ensure that an entity’s accounting systems properly 
support the financial reports that are required by the regulations. 
These legal firewalls ensure that corporations’ finances remain 
separate and distinct. 
Because the regulatory framework in which these companies 
operate establishes such legal firewalls, imposition of alter ego 
liability is particularly inappropriate. The regulatory framework fully 
accounts for the factors courts typically consider in determining 
whether to impose such liability, thereby ensuring that the conduct 
necessary to support such claims does not occur. 
Moreover, the regulators have developed specialized expertise in 
applying these standards in a particular industry. That expertise 
warrants preventing the courts from second guessing regulatory 
judgments. Indeed, in the insurance context, the regulatory 
framework imposes much more stringent requirements than would 
be imposed by the courts. The detailed monitoring of each material 
corporate transaction—often by multiple regulatory authorities—is 
far more demanding than the analysis typically employed by courts in 
ascertaining whether to pierce the corporate veil. Finally, there is 
inefficiency in having both regulators and the courts resolve the same 
questions. Judicial resources can be conserved by allowing such 
issues to remain where they belong—with the regulators. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Not only does abandonment of the veil piercing doctrines in the 
context of regulated industries make sense within the framework 
articulated by the courts, it also makes sense from an economic 
perspective. A wide range of law and economics scholars have argued 
that the veil piercing doctrines are best viewed as an attempt to 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to retain limited 
liability in circumstances where its benefits outweigh its costs and 
articulate certain exceptions to this general rule where the costs 
outweigh the benefits.160  
 
 160. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 77 (“A standard academic approach treats veil 
piercing as a safety valve allowing courts to address cases in which the externalities associated 
with limited liability seem excessive.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“The [veil 
piercing] cases may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits of 
limited liability against its costs. Courts are more likely to allow creditors to reach the assets of 
shareholders where limited liability provides minimal gains from improved liquidity and 
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1. Benefits of limited liability 
The traditional rule of limited liability for corporate shareholders 
may be justified on several grounds summarized in a classic article by 
Easterbrook and Fischel, and embellished in subsequent work by 
other law and economics scholars.161 First, limited liability reduces 
the economic costs of equity investment.162 Aside from the obvious 
reduction in cost associated with rigid rules prohibiting claims 
against shareholders, limited liability decreases shareholders’ “need 
to monitor” the corporation, as well as the potential liability they 
may incur to creditors absent such restrictions.163 In doing so, it 
encourages economic investment and the growth of organized 
markets. Conversely, abandoning limited liability may result in 
shareholder free riding. If there is no limited liability, “only a 
fraction of the gains expected from effective monitoring will go to 
the monitor.”164 The overall result may be a decrease in monitoring 
of corporate managers. 
Second, some commentators argue that limited liability also 
eliminates the costs of “monitoring other shareholders.”165 Because 
any judgments must be satisfied by the holdings of the shareholders 
in the absence of limited liability, shareholders have an incentive to 
monitor the wealth of all the other shareholders. While this factor 
may not be the most significant of those identified, to the extent it 
plays a role at all, it increases the costs associated with abandoning 
limited liability.  
 
diversification, while creating a high probability that a firm will engage in a socially excessive 
level of risk taking.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; see also infra notes 162–82 (discussing 
scholarly work building on Easterbrook and Fischel’s analysis). 
 162. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural 
Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992); Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 499; Leebron, supra 
note 78, at 1573; Presser, supra note 1, at 408. 
 163. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 94; Thompson, supra note 20, at 18 
(“Unlimited liability . . . can affect the market indirectly to the extent that it impacts on the 
amount of monitoring.”). 
 164. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 491–92; see also Ribstein, supra note 1, at 103. 
 165. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 95; Thompson, supra note 20, at 32–33 
(“[L]arge transaction costs are likely to be incurred in a move to extended liability; these costs 
include excessive monitoring and evasion strategies exceeding what now occurs.”). 
Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that limited liability reduces the cost of monitoring 
management because creditors may “possess a comparative advantage in monitoring particular 
managerial actions.” Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 100. 
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Third, commentators have suggested that limited liability 
facilitates the “free transfer of shares” and thus “gives managers 
incentives to act efficiently.”166 Limited liability facilitates the transfer 
of shares because all shares are valued equally and are “fungible”; the 
identity and wealth of other investors is irrelevant to the value of 
particular shares.167 If limited liability were abandoned, the value of 
shares would not be determined by the cash flows of the corporation, 
but rather would be dependent in part on these other factors. For 
the same reason, limited liability allows the share price to embody 
information about the actual “value of firms.”168 As a result, investors 
need not necessarily do their own research before purchasing but, 
assuming market efficiency, can have some confidence in the 
market’s valuation of a particular share.169 Without limited liability, 
there would be a significant danger that organized markets could not 
function efficiently, or at all, given the barriers shareholder liability 
may impose on the free transfer of shares. 
Fourth, limited liability affords shareholders an opportunity to 
diversify their holdings. Without limited liability, shareholders would 
be unlikely to hold a wide array of stocks under circumstances in 
which their personal holdings would be put at risk, and thus would 
be denied an important mechanism for reducing risk.170 Rather, they 
would more likely focus on only a few companies where they could 
better monitor management. The costs associated with increased 
monitoring would limit the scope of investment. Limited liability 
thereby ensures the benefits of diversification. Although critics have 
argued that a rule of proportional liability would eliminate the need 
for limited liability to ensure diversification,171 commentators 
 
 166. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 95. 
 167. Id. at 95–96. 
 168. Id. at 96.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 491 (“A rule of personal liability . . . would decrease 
shareholders’ ability to invest in a diverse portfolio of investments. The greater the degree of 
monitoring of each investment required, the fewer investments that will be made.”); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 96 (“limited liability allows more efficient 
diversification”); Thompson, supra note 20, at 32 (“[E]xtended liability will have a significant 
negative effect on the ability of shareholders to diversify, which in turn removes their risk-
bearing advantage and more generally will remove the standardized pricing of shares that has 
contributed significantly to the growth and development of liquid financial markets for 
shares.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3. 
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continue to argue that this is a powerful reason for continuing with 
the traditional approach. 
Fifth, limited liability prevents managers from becoming overly 
risk averse and rejecting projects that may have a positive net present 
value. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, this is “the real benefit 
of limited liability.”172 In the absence of limited liability, corporate 
managers would not undertake projects that may benefit society as a 
whole but involve inherent risks because they would fear that courts 
would impose shareholder liability. 
Finally, commentators have suggested that the transaction costs 
of bringing suit against numerous shareholders spread across the 
country (and in foreign jurisdictions)—which would be required if 
limited liability were abandoned—would be prohibitive.173 Given the 
practical difficulties and costs associated with imposing liability on 
corporate shareholders, any benefits derived from abolishing limited 
liability would be fleeting. Likewise, eliminating limited liability may 
increase the monitoring costs incurred by creditors who may be 
forced to monitor numerous shareholders in order to ensure that 
claims could be satisfied.174 
2. Mitigation of costs 
While some commentators have questioned these benefits of 
limited liability (albeit, less than completely persuasively), to the 
extent these benefits exist, they apply with equal weight in the 
context of regulated industries.175 Moreover, the regulatory 
framework eliminates or reduces certain of the potential costs of 
limited liability asserted by commentators. As one commentator has 
observed, “[w]ith limited liability, some business people will be 
tempted to cheat their creditors by obtaining credit when they know 
 
 172. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 97. 
 173. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 492 (arguing that “it would be prohibitively costly for 
the creditor of a corporation to bring individual suits against thousands of geographically 
diverse investors”); see also id. at 497 (“A related source of administrative costs for both tort 
creditors and society-at-large arises out of the difficulty of deciding which investors are liable 
on particular claims.”); Leebron, supra note 78, at 1611 (“The transaction costs of collecting 
the pro rata shares against typical individual shareholders would in almost every case be so high 
that it would not be worth it. The uncertain application of the rule would create substantial 
uncertainty.”). 
 174. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 492–93. 
 175. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 95, at 147 (“None of the arguments in favor of limited 
liability is ultimately persuasive.”). 
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they are unlikely to be able to repay or to cheat their customers and 
innocent third parties by knowingly selling dangerous products and 
services without adequate capital or insurance.”176 The regulatory 
framework mitigates these dangers by reducing the moral hazard 
problem associated with the externalization of risk where limited 
liability applies.  
First, the regulatory scheme significantly reduces the danger of 
undercapitalization. Undercapitalization increases the risks associated 
with limited liability because “the lower the amount of the firm’s 
capital, the greater the incentive to engage in excessively risky 
activities.”177 The constant monitoring of firms’ capitalization in the 
insurance and banking industries coupled with minimum capital 
requirements reduces the risk of undercapitalization and the 
concomitant risk that management may have an incentive to 
externalize costs for projects that would not have a net positive 
present value absent such externalization.  
Indeed, as Easterbrook and Fischel observed in their seminal 
article, “[l]egislatively imposed minimum-capitalization requirements 
are one method of internalizing the cost of risk taking.”178 It is 
exactly this sort of legislatively imposed requirement that mitigates 
the costs of limited liability within regulated industries such as the 
insurance and banking industries. Moreover, while Easterbrook and 
Fischel observe that there are obvious costs associated with such 
requirements, such as administrative costs and the cost of setting 
capital requirements too high179—and thus imposing minimum 
capitalization requirements may be a less desirable means of 
controlling moral hazard than the veil piercing doctrines—the fact 
that these requirements already exist in regulated industries means 
that these costs will be incurred anyway. Having incurred these costs, 
it is foolish not to reap the associated benefits and instead insist on 
the continuation of the veil piercing doctrines in such regulated 
industries. Veil piercing merely imposes additional costs without 
achieving any greater benefits (or at least benefits that are sufficiently 
great that they justify the additional costs).  
 
 176. Id. at 161. 
 177. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 113. 
 178. Id. at 114. 
 179. Id. (arguing that “the rate of return on equity investments will decrease” if 
minimum capital requirements are adopted across the board). 
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Second, direct “regulation of inputs” reduces the likelihood that 
managers will engage in unduly risky activities.180 As Easterbrook and 
Fischel observe, direct regulation of the business activities of 
corporations can be used to prevent the externalization of risk where 
inappropriate.181 This is exactly the situation in the insurance and 
banking industries, in which regulators directly monitor corporate 
activities to ensure that corporations do not engage in overly risky 
activities. Again, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that this means of 
addressing the moral hazard problem may not be superior to veil 
piercing because “[r]egulators have no better incentives than market 
participants to balance the social costs and benefits of engaging in 
certain activities.”182 However, like the rules governing capitalization, 
this is a system that is already in place. It makes no sense to incur the 
costs of duplicative mechanisms to control the same moral hazard 
problem when there is no evidence that there will be any incremental 
benefit, much less an incremental benefit that outweighs the 
significant additional costs. 
In sum, the costs of allowing veil piercing within regulated 
industries such as the insurance and banking industries significantly 
outweigh the benefits. Corporations functioning within such 
regulatory systems are already subject to multiple mechanisms 
designed to control the moral hazard problem. These mechanisms, 
like veil piercing, impose costs on society. Allowing veil piercing 
under such circumstances merely adds additional costs without any 
demonstrable additional benefits. Thus, from an economic 
perspective, veil piercing within such regulated industries simply 
makes no sense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The debate over limited liability and the proper scope of the veil 
piercing doctrines is likely to continue unabated given its significant 
practical importance and the lack of concrete empirical data to 
support the arguments on either side. Nonetheless, within this 
debate, there may be some common ground upon which scholars 
 
 180. Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182. Id. at 116 (“Whether the social costs of regulation exceed the social costs of 
excessively risky activities is an empirical question.”). 
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and commentators can reach a consensus. This Article attempts to 
identify one such area. 
Regulated industries such as insurance and banking provide a 
forum in which all commentators should agree that veil piercing is 
inappropriate and that the benefits of strict limited liability should be 
preserved. Regulation is an independent means by which the dangers 
of interactions among shareholders and corporate entities may be 
mitigated. Accordingly, it reduces the potential costs associated with 
limited liability that some commentators have suggested warrant 
erosion of such guarantees. At the same time, it retains many of the 
widely-recognized benefits of limited liability, which may be in some 
part responsible for the significant economic progress of our nation 
over the last two centuries. Accordingly, where such regulatory 
frameworks exist, the veil piercing doctrines should be abandoned. 
Indeed, the courts may already be applying such a de facto rule. 
Because these regulatory frameworks largely preclude the sort of 
conduct that courts have traditionally cited as justifying veil piercing, 
the actual application of such doctrines in these regulated industries 
appears to be rare.  
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